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necessarily rejected the statutory constructions approved by the Appellate
Division in the present case, and meant as to an occupational disease claim
that the employee's right to compensation and the employer's corresponding
liability accrue no later than the date when the illness requires medical atten-
tion."'14 Moreover, the Court recently held that where a true "accident" situa-
tion is present, the requirement of medical care is indicative of a disability in
itself regardless of a financial impairmentr
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, relying on section 42, takes cogni-
zance of the flexibility granted the board by that section, as a basis for cir-
cumventing the loss-of-wage-test where medical evidence has shown a dis-
ability prior to a diminution in earning power. If, on the other hand, the
construction emphasized by the Appellate Division were adopted, the em-
ployer's payroll record would necessarily dictate the date of disablement, there-
by leaving section 42 a meaningless appendage. Moreover, the Appellate Divi-
sion construction, if adopted, would be against the public interest, as it compels
the sufferer of an occupational disease who might desire to continue working
to quit work in order to get his medical bills paid. In fact, it was the Appellate
Division which, in an earlier case reviewing the legislative history of sections
37 and 42 pointed out, that the legislature in 1922, left section 37 as it was,
but rewrote the present section 42 such that the board "may determine" the
date of disablement. This is indicative of the legislature's intent to allow the
board some latitude in settling a controversey. The Court's decision in the
instant case, enlarging the scope of workman's compensation is in line with
the liberal trend of the majority of the New York decisions.' 0
Ronald L. Fancher
APPLICABILITY OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN BREACH OF WARRANTY AND
NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
In 1944 plaintiff was injected with a radiopaque chemical. Some of the
substance allegedly remained in his body causing a cascinoma to develop which
required an eye to be removed in 1957. Two years later plaintiff commenced
an action for breach of warranty and negligence against the manufacturer.
From a dismissal of the action by the Supreme Court, Special Term as time
barred,' and a unanimous affirmance by the Appellate Division,2 plaintiff ap-
14. Ibid.
15. Mastrodonato v. Pfaudler Co., 307 N.Y. 592, 597, 123 N.E.2d 83, 86 (1954).
16. See, e.g., Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950);
Kilmas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14
(1961) (heart attack victim); for a case decided since the instant case, cf., Hooper v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 12 N.Y.2d 767, 186 N.E.2d 565, 234 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1962).
1. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 30 Misc. 2d 663, 219 N.Y.S.2d 98
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
2. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 15 A.D.2d 650, 224 N.Y.S.2d 270
(1st Dep't 1962).
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pealed by permission to the Court of Appeals, held, affirmed, two judges dis-
senting. The action is time barred under the six year statute of limitations
for breach of warranty of fitness for use since this action accrues from the
date of sale and under the three year statute of limitations for a negligent
act resulting in personal injuries since this action accrues at the point at which
the forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury. Schwartz v. Heyden New-
port Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963).
When a plaintiff suffers personal injuries from a defective product he
may often elect to sue in negligence or breach of warranty. The latter may not
only be preferable but necessary due to its more extensive period of limitation.3
A number of jurisdictions have held however, that the shorter limitation period
is controlling where there are personal injuries regardless of whether the action
sounds in tort or contract.4 The period of limitation is measured from the
point at which "the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is inter-
posed." r5 In breach of warranty cases involving products liability the cause
of action accrues at the time of sale.6 A minority view however, holds that
where a product is latently defective in that its harmful propensities are not
ascertainable at the time of sale, the cause of action will accrue when the
deleterious effects are discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care, should
have been discovered. 7 While New York in following the former view has not
distinguished between express or implied warranties, other jurisdictions have
avoided the harshness of the "time of sale" theory by declaring a particular
warranty to be express and therefore, prospective in nature thereby declaring
the cause of action to accrue at the point of reasonable or actual discovery.
8
In cases of this type based on a theory of negligence, the cause of action ac-
crues at the time of injury to the plaintiff.9 It would seem to follow therefore,
that where a latently defective product does not manifest its harmful effects
until years later, the cause of action should not accrue until the said effects
3. N.Y. CPLR § 213 (2).
4. See, e.g., Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 226 P.2d 266 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1954); Zellmer v. Acme Brewing Co., 184 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1950); Seymour
v. Union News Co., 349 Il. App. 197, 110 N.E.2d 475 (1953); Blessington v. McCrory
Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
5. N.Y. CPLR § 203 (a).
6. Peterson v. Brown, 216 Ark. 709, 227 S.W.2d 142 (1950); Ricduti v. Voltarc
Tubes Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960); W. S. Rockwell Co. v. Lindquist Hardware Co.,
143 Conn. 684, 125 A.2d 173 (1956); Krueger v. V. P. Christianson Silo Co., 206 Wis.
460, 240 N.W. 145 (1932); Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d
421 (1953); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sheila Lynn Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 57 N.Y.S.2d
707 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 835, 61 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1st Dep't 1946); Kakargo
v. Grange Silo Co., 11 A.D.2d 796, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (2d Dep't 1960).
7. See, e.g., Poole v. Functional Const. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 391 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
1960); Southern Cal. Enterprises v. D.N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 178
P.2d 785 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Sheehy v. Eastern Importing & Mfg. Co., 44 App. D.C.
107 (1915).
8. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Enterprises v. D.N. & E. Walter & Co., supra note 7;
Felt v. Reynold's Fruit Evaporating Co., 52 Mich. 602, 18 N.W. 378 (1884).
9. Schmidt v. Merchant's Dispatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
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are known or knowable to the plaintiff. 10 New York, in Schmidt v. Merchant's
Dispatch Transp. Co., holds however that the cause of action accrues when
the initial tortious act inflicts the malady whether the said injury is discovered
or discoverable." It was held in New York, that where lung disease is con-
tracted as a result of breathing silica dust, the cause of action accrues from
the last point at which the plaintiff inhaled the dust, rather than at the point
or recognition of the disease.12 The Supreme Court on the other hand, has
held under a similar set of facts, that the cause of action would accrue only
upon discovery of the disease, since an employee could only be held to be in-
jured when the cumulative effects of the latently defective product were mani-
fested.13
The majority in the instant case perfunctorily dismissed the theory of
warranty by holding steadfast to the "time of sale" doctrine. The negligence
theory followed the pattern set by the Schmidt case in assuming that the harm
was done by the injection itself and therefore, the negligent act was completed
with injury to the plaintiff sufficient for accrual of the cause of action. The
dissent felt that if the carcinogenic qualities were not discoverable until seven
years later, it would be both unreasonable and perhaps unconstitutional to bar
the action.
The Statute speaks of computing the limitation from the time the cause
of action accrues until the claim is interposed. The courts are left with the
task of delineating the accrual period. Schmidt was decided in 1936, over
twenty-seven years ago, while the utilization of chemo-therapy in the field of
medicine is of a recent origin. The appearance of a vast array of organic and
inorganic compounds has resulted in a tremendous increase of injections and
oral consumption of drugs. This has had the effect of greatly expanding the
field of applied chemistry and creating a multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical
complex. Today we are faced not only with broad spectra anti-biotics, but
also the use of drugs to affect. behavior patterns. Drugs having the latter
qualities may often produce injuries not ascertainable for years. Witness the
following account:
DRUG LSD IS DECLARED DANGEROUS
The American Medical Assn. Journal warned Thursday that the
drug LSD-25 and similar drugs that alter sensory perception have
the power to cripple the mind permanently.
An editorial in the current Journal said accumulating evidence "dem-
onstrates that these drugs have the power to damage the individual
psyche, indeed cripple it for life."
10. Sylvania Elec. Products v. Barker 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 988 (1956); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa.
1960).
11. Schmidt v. Merchant's Dispatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824
(1936).
12. Ibid.
13. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
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The editorial, signed by Dr. Dana L. Farnsworth, Cambridge, Mass.,
challenged the claim that these drugs "free" the mind for creative
work. Farnsworth said a dangerous situation is developing because
public interest in these drugs is on the increase in many sections of
the United States. "Many men and women who should not do so,
especially college students, are experimenting with these drugs," he
said.
14
A majority report of the Senate subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
concluded that, with respect to deleterious side effects, the pharmaceutical
houses:
in their advertisements have tended to handle the matter in either
of two ways: Ignore side effects entirely or note and then dismiss
the subject with some sort or reassuring phrase.' 5
Testimony elicited shows that side effects of certain drugs may not become
apparent until used by "thousands and thousands of patients."' 6 In certain
instances drugs are rushed on the market with a view to meeting and beating
competition rather than to insure the maximum in controlled testing.
17 Al-
though a contrary result in the instant case, i.e., computing the accrual of the
cause of action from the time of reasonable discovery of the side effects, may
not prevent the release of latently dangerous drugs on an unwary public, it
would place the risk upon the drug industry which could then chalk up the
misery it has inflicted as an item in the cost of goods sold.
William A. Carnahan
ZONING
ZONING ORDINANCE-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY ESTAB-
LISHED SET-BACx LINs
A town zoning ordinance passed in 1961 required proposed dwellings to be
set back from the road edge an amount equal to a set-back line which was
determined by averaging the set-backs of existing homes within 300 feet on
either side. This repealed a 1945 ordinance which contained an identical provi-
sion. Petitioner-plaintiff, Sierra Construction Company, after having pre-
viously laid a foundation for a home with a 61 1/2 foot set-back, was refused
a building permit because the home was within 300 feet of four homes built in
1958, each having an eighty-two foot set-back. The Board of Zoning Appeals
affirmed this action. In an Article 78 proceeding, Monroe County's Supreme
14. Buffalo Courier Express, Sept. 13, 1963, p.1, col. 5.
15. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly oj the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. Report no. 448, at 198 (1961).
16. Id. at 201.
17. Id. at 187.
